owens002@umn.edu

808 Heller
612-625-0851

For some years now my research has focused on such psychological notions as belief and desire. The traditional understanding of these notions seems to be plagued with a variety of difficulties (linguistic, metaphysical, and epistemological). Contemporary accounts (e.g., of the functionalist variety), which are typically designed to avoid some of the difficulties and obscurities in the traditional account, face new and deep difficulties of their own.

In my research and teaching I attempt to address these issues from a variety of perspectives. From the philosophy of language perspective, I have been concerned with problems relating to the logic and application conditions of belief ascriptions. I also continue to work on issues relating to the nature of mental states--issues that more properly belong to the philosophy of mind. Then, within the scope of the philosophy of psychology, there are issues relating to the role of these states (or close analogues) in common sense and theoretical explanations (e.g., of the cognitive kind) of behavior.

Selected Publications

"Pierre and the Fundamental Assumption." Mind and Language 10 (1995).

Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Editor with C.A. Anderson. Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1990.

"Contradictory Belief and Cognitive Access." In Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14. University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

"In Defense of a Different Doppelganger." Philosophical Review 96 (1987).

"The Failure of Lewis's Functionalism." Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986).

"Synonymy and the Non-Individualistic Model of the Mental." Synthese 66 (1986).

"Functionalism and Propositional Attitudes." Nous 17 (1983).