pwhanks@umn.edu

817 Heller
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My interests are in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and the history of analytic philosophy.

In my research I pursue questions about the nature of propositions. I have argued that the Fregean distinction between content and force is untenable, and that we should individuate propositions in terms of concepts of force. I think that there are assertive propositions, interrogative propositions and imperative propositions. One main motivation for this view is that it can solve the problem of the unity of the proposition. This is the problem of explaining what makes a proposition into something more than a collection of entities. A mere collection is not the sort of thing that can be true or false. Therefore, in order to have a truth-value, the constituents of a proposition must be bound together into a unity. This problem is at the center of my research.

Selected Publications

"Conceiving of Pain," (with Brendan O'Sullivan), Dialogue, forthcoming.

"A Dilemma About Necessity," Erkenntnis 68, Jan. 2008, 129-148.

"The Content-Force Distinction," Philosophical Studies 134, May 2007, 141-164.

"How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment," Synthese 154, Jan. 2007, 121-146.

"Critical Study of Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity by Scott Soames," Noûs 40, March 2006, 184-203.

"Questions," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, Macmillan, 2006.